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COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS. By Robert Braucher,' Arthur E. Suther-
land, Jr.,2 and Bertram F. Willcox.3 Brooklyn: The Foundation
Press, Inc. 1953. Two volumes: Cases and Problems, pp. xxviii,
io95; Text-Forms-Statutes, pp. xxvi, 403, xxxii, 816. $I5.OO.
Although I am on several issues in disagreement with the plan of these
volumes, there are, even from a dissenter's point of view, many things
that compel admiration. The case material is extraordinarily rich.
Professors Braucher, Sutherland, and Willcox appear to have read every
reported case in the enormous area of law with which they deal. Thus,
quite apart from its merits as a teaching tool, the book has great value
as a reference work for practitioner and academician alike. The case
harvest ranges from the classical "leading case," included principally for
historical interest - such as Price v. Neal 4 - to the hypermodern, such
as the string of post-i 9 5o cases on the effect of accounts receivable stat-
utes on the rule of Benedict v. Ratner.5 On the whole the authors have
concentrated on the recent cases, but so amply is their book proportioned
that they have probably included more of the traditional material than
will be found in many of the old-line casebooks.
The authors have been quite as generous with forms as they have with
cases, and to equally good effect. The Text-Forms-Statutes volume con-
tains forty-four forms, which include the conventional negotiable instru-
ments - check, promissory note, and draft; the documents of title -
warehouse receipt and bill of lading, in both nonnegotiable and negoti-
able versions; fire and marine insurance policies; conditional sale con-
tracts; chattel mortgage; trust receipt; and letter of credit forms. It has
long been a legitimate complaint of students that discussions of such
things as bills of lading and trust receipts, which no one in the class ex-
cept (possibly) the instructor has ever seen in the flesh, are largely a
waste of time. Professors Braucher, Sutherland, and Willcox have done
the most thorough job of satisfying this objection that has appeared to
date. Except for examples of an accounts receivable financing agree-
ment and a factor's lien agreement, they have included everything that
could be useful to student, instructor, and practitioner.
In the Cases and Problems volume, Parts I (333 pages) and V (197
pages) contain what used to be taught in the Sales course: warranties,
passage of title, seller's and buyer's remedies, purchase money security,
documents of title, documentary sales. In addition Part V contains about
50 pages on insurance questions, which have customarily not been cov-
'Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
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ered outside of specialized Insurance courses. The warranty treatment
is unusually full and exceptionally interesting. The nature of documents,
their negotiation, and the incidents of documentary sales are also re-
hearsed at length; these sections in particular, I felt, while teaching the
book, were well-organized and contained a great deal of illuminating
matter. On the other hand, the introductory purchase money security
material, which concludes Part I, seemed to me to be scanty, overly com-
pressed, and confusing.
Part II (331 pages) contains most of the conventional negotiable in-
struments material, with certain additions and deletions. Part II-A raises
the question of formal requisites; here the authors have used a novel
and interesting approach which prefaces the discussion of what is nego-
tiable paper with a fairly elaborate consideration of financing on the
security of open accounts receivable. The progression in Part II-A is
from the nonnegotiable chose in action to the negotiable promissory note,
dealt with principally in the context of its use in consumer installment
finance. There are ideas which look well on the drafting board but work
out poorly in practice, and this may be one of them. The sequence from
nonnegotiable to negotiable ought to be helpful to students, but most of
mine lost sight of the forest from the profusion of trees which surrounded
them. From the basic question of negotiability the authors proceed to
matters which used to appear in a chapter called "Liability of Parties,"
here rechristened "Payment by Check"; in addition to standard material
on the status of drawer, drawee, and indorsers, the authors have included
in this part good discussions of the relationship between a depositor and
his bank (stop payment orders and overdrafts) and the mechanics of
bank collection.
The focus of discussion then shifts rather surprisingly to what might
be considered, in connection with what has gone before, the old-fashioned
law of suretyship. Three short sections, in which the authors have de-
pended to an unusual degree on running analytical comment, rehearse
the standard suretyship doctrines (the strictissimi juris slogan, availabil-
ity of defenses, the Pain v. Packard 6 doctrine, rights to subrogation, re-
imbursement, and the like) as an introduction to the complicated prob-
lems raised by the Negotiable Instruments Law's fragmentary coverage of
the rights and liabilities of accommodation parties on negotiable papers.
The NIL problems themselves get two more sections. The suretyship
material is concluded by a final section on letters of credit, which are
presumably brought in at this point because historically the first analogy
to which the courts turned in working out the letter of credit complex
was the suretyship relation. Today the suretyship analogy, which once
had its uses, is misleading to a practitioner and confusing to a student.
I feel that the authors would have done better to omit the letter of
credit at this point and develop it in connection with their elaborate
treatment of the documentary sale in Part V, where in fact some addi-
6 13 Johns. *174 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. i816).
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tional letter of credit material appears, separated by five hundred pages
or so from the initial consideration under the suretyship heading.
Suretyship is followed by a full-dress treatment of problems of forgery
and alteration of negotiable instruments (including the cases of the im-
postor and fictitious payee). Here, I confess, the principle of organiza-
tion completely eludes me. The authors' thought in the earlier subdivi-
sions of the negotiable instruments material was apparently to use
present-day financing and banking transactions as the framework: thus
the note is brought up in the context of consumer installment finance, the
check material emphasizes the position of the bank as depositary, collec-
tion agent, or drawee, and the suretyship material may have been in-
cluded in view of the practice of banks and personal loan companies to
require sureties or accommodation parties to go on notes. If I am correct
in what I think is the basic plan of organization, which is a good one,
then I do not know at all why the forgery and alteration material is pre-
sented at such length and with such prominence. Here the authors seem
to have reverted to a more old-fashioned approach to the law, which is
not in itself bad, but which creates the rather uneasy effect of a com-
fortable Victorian easy chair alone in a roomful of modern furniture.
The notable addition which the authors have made to the usual col-
lection of negotiable instruments materials is their inclusion of surety-
ship. Their most notable deletion is in the scanty part reserved for the
holder in due course, who has traditionally been the hero of the play.
The authors have not attempted the impossible task of ignoring the
holder in due course altogether; there are incidental references to the
ex-hero throughout, but there is no schematic treatment of the concept.
The authors' idea seems to have been to treat "holder in due course" as
a subcategory in a part of the book (Part III) organized about the more
general idea of good faith purchase. As an idea for teaching in a book
which like this one cuts across several of the traditional fields, the gen-
eralized treatment of good faith purchase, as it applies both in and out-
side negotiable instruments law, seems to me to be an exceedingly fertile
and fruitful one. My objection is that the authors do not seem to have
accomplished what they set out to do, though I may be wrong in as-
suming that they set out to do it. Part III has the promising title of
"The Protection of Third Parties," and Subpart A holds out a discussion
of "Bona Fide Purchase." The promise is deceptive: three sections, in
all 38 pages, are given to good faith purchase in the law of sales, nego-
tiable instruments, and investment securities (the treatment of negotia-
tion and good faith purchase of documents of title being postponed for
separate consideration in Part V). This brevity contrasts oddly with the
eight sections and 79 pages on forgery and alteration of negotiable in-
struments alone. I agree with the authors that a study of the good faith
purchase concept in its various guises, including that of the holder in
due course, would be excellent teaching material (although I do not
understand in the least why they chose to treat the good faith purchase
of documents separately), but I think they have given it far too little
space.
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The third major division of the book, in addition to Sales and Nego-
tiable Instruments, is what may be called Chattel Security. There is
quantitatively a great deal of this type of material scattered through the
book and, as always, the selection of cases and other material is excel-
lent. No other casebook that I am familiar with comes even close to
Braucher, Sutherland, and Willcox in its thoroughness of coverage of
the principal developments over the past ten or fifteen years in this
rapidly changing and exceedingly difficult field. My quarrel with them
is, once again, on questions of organization, and, in this part of the book,
I must reluctantly conclude that I have no idea what they are driving
at.
Security first comes up at the end of Part I on Sales under the heading
"Purchase Money Security." At that point there are half a dozen sec-
tions dealing with such diverse issues as the familiar attempt to disguise
a security transaction by calling it something else, the equity of redemp-
tion, the foreclosure of chattel security, and the effect of usury laws and
small loan legislation. Next, the commercial paper part starts out with
some difficult material involving accounts receivable financing and the
effect of recent statutes on the rule of Benedict v. Ratner; then, in con-
nection with negotiable notes, two sections .contrast the position of the
"financing agency" as a holder in due course of notes and a bona fide
purchaser of property. After a gap of more than three hundred pages, a
series of sections under the heading "The Protection of Creditors" takes
up successively the question of a seller's retention of goods sold (which
in part repeats material already covered at a much earlier point), fraudu-
lent conveyances, bulk sales, and preferences. This group of creditors'
rights sections is followed by a group devoted to the operation of record-
ing acts, including state motor vehicle registration and national recorda-
tion. Following all this comes the main chattel security part of the book,
which in successive sections takes up the distinguishing features of such
security devices as consignment, pledge, conditional sale, trust receipt,
chattel mortgage, and factor's lien. The two final sections in this part
seem to repeat material (particularly the Benedict v. Ratner complex)
already covered 500 pages earlier.
The several sets of sections devoted to security problems (not includ-
ing the material on documentary pledges and letters of credit) run to
approximately three hundred pages, nearly a third of the book. Yet it
seems to me that, in their eagerness to widen their coverage and stay
abreast of the times, the authors have scanted or ignored entirely several
basic problems. The treatment of default rights is not only sketchy but
also comes in almost at the beginning of the material, before there has
been any consideration of what the various security devices are, either
factually or doctrinally. There is nothing on the important and inter-
esting question of the financing of so-called fixtures. The treatment of
consumer finance suffers from being made to do double duty: it is used
partly to illustrate on a highly conceptual level the basic concepts of
negotiability (for which it is poorly suited) and partly to illustrate
developing social and judicial controls over lending practices ,(where
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the negotiability concepts merely get in the way). Finally, there is the
curious manner in which the authors have split the security material:
if their arrangement is followed the result in a full year course would be
that, after two or three weeks in the fall, there would be a gap.of several
months after which, sometime in the spring, the discussion would take
up where it had left off.
It is a great deal easier to throw bricks than it is to build something
with them. Professors Braucher, Sutherland, and Willcox have at-
tempted an ambitious piece of construction. While I feel that their
execution has been imperfect, I have the greatest admiration for their
undertaking. Their prodigious labors have made apparent, as no other
casebook has done, both the strengths and weaknesses of a currently
fashionable approach to law teaching which goes under the name of
"integration."
The present law school curriculum is in great measure the product of
historical accident. This is particularly evident in the split between
so-called public law and private law courses. With the exception of
Constitutional Law, which has presumably always been with us, the law
curriculum of, say, i9i consisted in the main of the private law
courses; even now more than one graduate of the Harvard Law School
looks back nostalgically to what was unquestionably a golden era in the
School's history and demands a return to the fundamentals of the
common law as a panacea for the ills which beset us. The exigencies of
our own century have compelled the addition of layer on layer of public
law to the primitive curriculum. The public law courses have come in
one by one in response to shifts in the nature of law practice: no doubt
students ought to learn more about the action of trover for conversion
than they are apt to learn, at least in my own school, but after all the
first memorandum of law which the graduate will have to write is much
more apt to deal with a subsection of the Public Utility Holding Com-
pany Act than with the niceties of the forms of action. By now a good
half of the available law school time has been gobbled up by the public
law courses. Meanwhile the private law side has not been allowed to
keep a steady eye on the fundamentals of the common law. The field of
commercial law which Professors Braucher, Sutherland, and Willcox
have claimed as their own has become a statutory maze which need
hardly yield the palm to the Internal Revenue Code for difficulty, ob-
scurity, and incomprehensibility.
The radical reconstruction of the law school curriculum has taken
place by accident, without forethought or plan, and has ended us in
obvious confusion. Everyone is agreed that something must be done,
but there is no large measure of agreement on what. Two propositions,
however, command a nearly unanimous suffrage: one is that too many
courses are being taught, the other is that the traditional dividing lines
between courses no longer make sense in many cases. The idea has
gained currency that by recombining related material formerly taught
in independent courses there can be achieved both a more rational
presentation of basic concepts and a net saving of semester hours. The
I9551
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two fields in which this sort of reorganization has to date been most
thoroughly carried out are both on the private law side: one is what
is being called Estate Planning, which picks up parts of the old courses
in Trusts, Future Interests, and Taxation; the other is in Commercial
Law where the new course, in the Braucher, Sutherland, and Willcox
version, supersedes the old courses in Sales, Negotiable Instruments,
Chattel Security, Suretyship, and (at least in part) Creditors' Rights.
Thus in six or even four semester hours the student gets in one package
what he formerly spent up to twelve hours on in several packages.
We can all subscribe to the ideas that the law school curriculum must
be pruned and that it is desirable for related materials to be presented in
such a way that the relationship can be perceived by the student. But
that does not tell us how to accomplish those results. When four or five
courses, which required twelve or fifteen semester hours, are combined
into one course, which is given in four hours or six, one of two sacrifices
must be made: either the new course must give up the breadth of cover-
age which the old courses had or, if the old coverage is maintained, the
new course must to a degree give up the attempt to penetrate in depth
the material covered. Professors Braucher, Sutherland, and Willcox
seem to have made the latter choice, which is, I believe, a disastrous one
for legal education.
We must not confuse law school education with undergraduate college
education. It may be that the essential function of the liberal arts
college is to produce citizens who have a decent smattering of the essen-
tial knowledge on which our culture depends. That is not the function
of the law school. The law school exists to teach not facts, but what to
do with facts; not rtiles and doctrines, but how rules and doctrines
grow and die; not the state of the law, but the process of legal change.
The law school curriculum should not be broadened; it should be nar-
rowed. Whatever we teach should be taught intensively and in depth.
One case, painstakingly analyzed and laboriously dissected, is worth
more than a hundred cases imperfectly digested. We should avoid like
the plague the brisk, comprehensive, and up-to-the-minute survey.
It is more convenient and more effective to discuss legal method with
our students against a background that is contemporary rather than one
that is fifty or a hundred years old. Issues that are presently unsettled
and in controversy strike more fire and response from the students than
do those that have been classified, ticketed, and put away on the shelf.
It is inevitable and desirable that the factual content of law school
courses should shift decade by decade. But the factual content, at any
given time, is not, and should never be allowed to become, the main
thing; the graduate of the class of igio is instinctively in the right in
insisting on a return to the fundamental elements of the law.
The organization of our society is more complicated today than it
was forty-five years ago and by reflection a lawyer's practice is more
complicated. The active practitioner must command a much wider range
of knowledge and of technical skills than his predecessor. One way or
another he must learn more, quantitatively, than his father had to. There
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is a great temptation to use the law school as an engine for pumping the
embryonic lawyer full of those necessary facts. To the extent that the
law schools yield to the temptation, a mediocre generation of lawyers
will be produced.
The solution to the law school dilemma of too much law and too little
time in which to teach it lies in a. deliberate exclusion of material from
the formal instruction given in the courses. The courses and seminars
offered in the second and third years should increasingly become studies
of selected problems within a field rather than broad-gauge surveys of
entire fields. The adoption of such a policy is made possible today by
the fact that, in the present century, there has developed a comprehen-
sive legal literature. In almost all fields of law we have general treatises
which are at least adequate and in some instances truly distinguished.
The law reviews provide detailed treatment of every imaginable subject.
When the Harvard Law School introduced the case method of teaching,
none of this literature was available. Today we have it and the way out
of our dilemma is to use it. If our students do not know how to read,
they should be required to learn. Once they know how to read, they
should, after having received the basic instruction of the first year, learn
a great deal of their law by reading for themselves. The time available
for instruction should then be used for intensive study of narrow prob-
lems, which is the only way I know of training lawyers, as distinguished
from people who know rules of law.
The Text-Forms-Statutes volume of Braucher, Sutherland, and Will-
cox seems an attempt to make students learn their law by reading it
themselves. It contains a series of text discussions paralleling the sec-
tions into which the Cases and Problems volume is divided. These dis-
cussions, according to the authors, are planned to be used as "prepara-
tory summer reading, and as a supplement to casebook instruction dur-
ing the year." (p. v) The preparatory summer reading idea seems to
have induced the authors to write this material in a deliberately over-
simplified style. The oversimplification has the further consequence
that the text is by no means as useful as it might otherwise have been
for the suggested alternative of use as a supplement to casebook instruc-
tion during the year. But the idea of a specially prepared text tailored
to accompany and supplement the case and problem material is a good
one, and I dare say we shall see much more of this sort of thing in case-
books from now on.
It is unfortunate that the idea of "integration" has become con-
fused with the idea of saving time in the overcrowded curriculum, since
the two are essentially unrelated. Presenting related materials in con-
text does not necessarily take less time than presenting them separately;
it may take more. In any case the idea of "integrating" in one course
material which has previously been taught in separate courses ought to
be judged on its own merits and not adopted or discarded merely on the
basis of how many hours of classroom instruction it saves. "Integration"
is a tricky word. I do not think that a course in Sales is integrated with
a course in Negotiable Instruments merely because the two sets of ma-
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terials are bound within the covers of one book. Integration, if it is to
be anything more than an empty slogan, must be more than that.
The authors have started with the idea that here is a common core of
substance in the transactions which cluster around the sale of goods.
There is the sale itself, with the rights and liabilities arising from the
transfer of property. There is always the question of payment and fre-
quently a question of credit extension; these often involve the execution
of negotiable instruments, and the instruments in turn involve the use of
the bank collection system. Finally there will be security transactions,
with either the goods themselves or the accounts, notes, or drafts arising
from their sale standing as collateral. It is obvious that all these "trans-
actions" are in a sense related; certainly the business man who sells
goods, and the lawyer who advises him, must think of all these aspects
as parts of one whole. It is tempting to conclude that all these things,
being related, are better taught in one course - should be, as the phrase
goes, integrated. It may be noted that we have at best a partial integra-
tion; in addition to thinking of the sales aspect, the payment and
credit aspect, and the security aspect, the businessman and his
lawyer must also think of such things as tax advantages, fair trade
laws, antitrust statutes, and so on. Yet no one seriously proposes that
all these aspects of commercial life be integrated into one course. There
is still some merit in the idea of the division of labor. But, the argument
must run, sales, negotiable instruments, and chattel security transac-
tions are so closely connected that they at least are better taught to-
gether.
Much of the Braucher, Sutherland, and Willcox casebook seems to
me to be integration on the slogan level. The first three hundred pages
on Sales are followed by another three hundred pages on Negotiable
Instruments. These two blocks of material do not correlate, communi-
cate, or cross-check any more in this format than when they are bound
separately; the law of checks and the law of warranties are quite as
separate - or quite as integrated - here as they have been in the past,
no more and no less. I do not mean in the least to suggest that the
authors have missed a trick and that, by giving more thought to the
matter, they could have so arranged their material as to cast light on the
essential connection between the rule that a check is not of itself an
assignment and the rule that a buyer may recover damages for breach
of warranty. I do not think there is any essential connection. Despite
the seductive sound of the word "integration," the only way you can
teach the law of checks and the law of warranties is as two separate
things-which is what they are. Putting the check material and the
warranty material within the covers of one book may be a little more
convenient - or a little less - than having the material in two books,
but it has nothing to do with integration.
There are on the other hand several parts of the book in which the
authors have experimented with reorganizations of material that qual-
ify as "integration" in any league. The most interesting of these attempts
to me was the gathering together of material in Part III under the
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heading "The Protection of Third Parties." Here comparable concepts
from the law of sales, the law of assignment, and the law of negotiable
instruments are brought together and their conjunction should illuminate
for many students what have hitherto been dark and cloudy areas of the
law. If this is what is meant by integration, the more we can get of it
the better. I trust that the next edition of the casebook will contain a
good deal more material like that presently included in Part III. It is
hard stuff to teach; it is hard to study; it is rewarding to both teacher
and student.
In reviewing most casebooks it is sufficient to say that the authors
have (or have not) done an admirable job of collecting and organizing
their material; that the notes are (or are not) exhaustive, illuminating,
clear, concise, and witty; that the typography is clear and the width of
the margins satisfactory. Professors Braucher, Sutherland, and Willcox
have made it impossible to discuss their book except in terms of basic
theories of legal education. If the reviewer could restrict himself to com-
ment on the craftsmanship and scholarship which have gone into the
book, the review would be, except for some reservations as to organiza-
tion, an almost uninterrupted paean of praise. Life always becomes
more difficult when matters of theory elbow their way in. I am not even
sure that I am in theoretical disagreement with the three authors; it may
be that they would, in their triune fashion, agree with all that I have
said and that I am disagreeing with three other fellows or else objecting
to conclusions which some people (but not the authors) might draw
from premises on which we all agree.
Whether I am fighting with Professors Braucher, Sutherland, and
Willcox or with a straw man of my own creation, the following proposi-
tions seem to me to be of importance:
(i) The law school curriculum is overcrowded, but the only way to
make enough space is by jettisoning some of the existing cargo and not
by a repackaging job.
(2) Many of the existing divisions between courses are arbitrary,
whimsical, and irrational. A good deal of progress can be made by pre-
senting related concepts, as they appear in traditionally separate fields,
in context; the Braucher, Sutherland, and Willcox book indicates some
of the possibilities of this sort of reorganization.
(3) The type of integration referred to in (2), which is useful, is
primarily integration on a conceptual level. It should not be confused
with the mere gathering together in one course or one casebook of con-
ceptually unrelated material simply on the ground that there are many
facets to a commercial transaction. There is nothing wrong with teach-
ing Sales and Negotiable Instruments as parts of one course instead of
as two separate courses; but neither does it make very much difference
which way you do it.
(4) Law school education is on a graduate and not an undergraduate
level. The survey-type course has no place in the law school. What is
most disturbing about the book is the temptation it affords to succumb
to survey-type teaching. It contains enough to furnish half a dozen
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courses, all of them good. If the instructor will make a judicious selection
out of this mass, the book contains a wealth of admirably chosen ma-
terial. But any attempt to "teach through" the book in 'four or six or
eight semester hours can lead only to the type of course which the law
school should not tolerate.
(5) In bringing the subject matter of law school courses up to date
we should always keep in mind that we are attempting to teach students
how to think and not merely to cram them full of useful knowledge.
The focus of law school instruction should be on the theoretical rather
than the practical side of the law. The anguished cries that are occa-
sionally heard from some sections of the practicing bar are as nothing to
what would be heard if the law schools really did go over to "practical"
instruction. The "fundamental principles of law" are no more numerous
and no more complex now then they were in I9IO. The setting has
changed; the decor is different; but there is nothing functional in allow-
ing ourselves to be swamped in a multitude of details.
GRANT GLMoRE *
COGITATIONS ON ToRTs. By Warren A. Seavey.' Lincoln: The Uni-
versity of Nebraska Press. 1954. PP. 72. $2.00.
Professor Seavey pays a graceful tribute when he says that, in matters
of procedure, the Americans might learn much from the English judges.
May I, as an English judge, return the compliment, and say that, in
matters of substantive law, the English might learn much from the
American professors. This little book contains three lectures given in
honor of Dean Roscoe Pound by one of his most distinguished disciples.
They show a breadth of vision which is refreshing and invigorating to
one who is sometimes cast down by the narrow scan of precedents. Pro-
fessor Seavey has taken a broad canvas and painted in fine strong
colors a picture of the law of torts, past, present, and future.
Professor Seavey adopts Pound's theory that a rule of law is the
result of weighing the conflicting interests of the parties. On the one
side there is the value to the community of what the defendant is doing.
On the other there is the interest of the community in not having harm
occur. He shows how this weighing of interests has continually affected
the development of the law. A striking instance could be given from
England in regard to the liability of hospital authorities. When these
were charitable institutions, the courts exempted them from liability
for the negligence of their doctors and nurses.2 Their value to the
community was so great that it would not be right to saddle them with
liability to patients. But when they became state institutions, the courts
held them liable.3 There was no reason why the state, with its bottom-
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
Bussey Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
2 See Hillyer v. St. Bartholomew's Hospital, [19o] 2 K.B. 82o (CA.).
'See Cassidy v. Ministry of Health, [19 5 11 2 K.B. 343 (C.A.).
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